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Introduction  
  This paper discusses old-age security, consisting in Europe mainly 
of general social pension systems, in the light of subsidiarity. Main focus 
is on the consequences of the last Enlargement by ten, primarily Central 
and Eastern European countries. They have brought into EU partly 
different experiences of old- age security which may have some 
importance for EU as a whole.  
Both horizontal and vertical subsidiarity are discussed. Although 
subsidiarity is clearly a normative concept, the approach here tries to be 
as positive as possible. The aim of the paper is to analyze the situation so 
far, possible arguments and perspectives. 
The paper starts with a discussion of terminology. The next two 
sections deal with both dimensions of subsidiarity in the area of old-age 
security in the EU: horizontal and vertical subsidiarity. Both sections have 
similar structure: start with some conceptual introduction, than discuss 
situation in the EU before Enlargement and finally consequences of 
accession of the new member states. The fourth section is about the 
future of old-age security in the EU in the light of subsidiarity. 
Most issues of this broad topic can only be touched here.  
 
1.Terminology  
1.1 The origins: Roman Catholic Thought  
  The principle of subsidiarity has its origins in Roman Catholic 
thought, and was developed in the Encyclical “Rerum Novarum” of 1891 
by Pope Leo XIII.  The principle is based upon the autonomy and dignity 
of the human individual. All other forms of society, from the family to the 
state and the international organizations, should be in the service of the 
human person. The principle emphasizes the importance of small and 
intermediate-sized communities or institutions, like the family, the 
church, and voluntary associations. A higher-ranked community should 
undertake an initiative only if the smaller community cannot solve the 
problem. The state (government) is an “instance of last resort”. It should, 
however, as well as other intermediate-sized communities, create 
conditions necessary to the development of the individual. 
  The principle was originally developed as a “middle course” 
between laissez-faire capitalism on the one hand and the various forms of 
totalitarianism, which subordinate the individual to the state, on the 
other. 
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1.2.  Subsidiarity - contemporary interpretations 
There are at present various meanings and interpretations of the 
term “subsidiarity”. Subsidiarity is usually considered in two dimensions: 
vertical/ horizontal and negative/positive (table 1). 
 
Table 1  Dimensions of subsidiarity 
 
Dimensions of 
subsidiarity 
Vertical subsidiarity  Horizontal subsidiarity 
Subject  Distribution of powers 
among different levels 
of government and 
sovereignty: the EU, 
national states, regions 
and municipalities 
Responsibility and 
freedom of human 
beings as well as social 
and economic powers 
(relations between 
state, society and 
market) 
Negative subsidiarity  The central 
government (or an 
international 
organization like the 
EU) should not take 
action unless the 
government at a lower 
level (or a member 
state) cannot solve the 
problem or it is more 
effective to do it at the 
higher level. 
The state should not 
violate freedom and 
individual responsibility 
(in both society and 
the economic sphere), 
which must be 
respected in a 
maximum degree. 
Positive subsidiarity  The government at a 
higher level should 
support the 
government at a lower 
level in fulfilling its 
functions. 
Support must be given 
by a “superior power” 
whenever freedom and 
individual responsibility 
do not suffice for the 
achievement of ends 
necessary for the 
dignity of human 
beings 
Source: Author, based on Curzio 2003. 
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1.3. Vertical subsidiarity 
  Much more often, and in the context of the EU almost exclusively, 
the concept of vertical subsidiarity is discussed. It is useful to distinguish 
two levels of vertical subsidiarity: the first concerns relations between an 
international organization, like the EU and its member states, the second 
is about relations of different levels of government in one country. 
The EU Glossary states that “the subsidiarity principle is intended 
to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and 
that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level 
is justified in the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or 
local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the Union does not 
take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive 
competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, 
regional or local level” (Glossary: Subsidiarity).  
  (Vertical) subsidiarity has been formulated since the Treaty of 
Maastricht in the EU law. Article 9 of the new European constitution 
states: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and insofar as 
the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved at Union level” (Constitution 2003). 
  When relations between different levels of government within a 
country are subject of analysis, vertical subsidiarity is especially applied 
in the context of federal states, concerning the division of powers and 
responsibilities between the federal and regional (state, provinces etc) 
governments. In this meaning vertical subsidiarity is an equivalent for 
federalism (in economics mainly developed as fiscal federalism).  The 
issues where a given competence should be located are, however, 
relevant also to non-federal states with regional structures of 
government. 
  Both levels of vertical subsidiarity: between (say) EU and member 
states, and between various levels of government in one country, are 
interrelated. Subsidiarity is about whether a given competence is (should 
be) located at the EU level, at the central (federal) government level of 
member states, or at a regional (local) level of member states. 
 
1.4. Horizontal subsidiarity 
Horizontal subsidiarity is a much less known concept. It is neither 
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vertical subsidiarity is understood. This does not mean, however, that the 
problems which are described with the term are new. One could even 
argue that some crucial questions raised by horizontal subsidiarity, 
especially relations between state and market, are a central issue of 
many disciplines, including economics. The problems are there described 
under different labels, e.g. “public-private mix”.  
  The principle of horizontal subsidiarity has been recently 
introduced in the Italian Constitution. Horizontal subsidiarity is an 
enlargement of the subsidiarity concept. “This enlarged vision of 
subsidiarity obviously implies a new vision of public management, which 
can be defined “shared administration” (Active Citizenship 2003).  
Also at the EU level, horizontal subsidiarity has in reality 
developed very substantially recently. The internal European market has 
created a new kind of economic freedoms and increased competition. This 
has also important consequences for social security. 
 
1.5.  Concluding remarks  
Subsidiarity is related to some other principles. Because of the 
lack of space only two  are shortly mentioned here. In the EU law 
(including Constitution) it is the principle of proportionality (“the content 
and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to echieve 
the objectives of the Constitution”, Constitution 2003). 
In a broader sense, the other crucial principle both in the 
construction of the EU as well as for every society is solidarity (Curzio 
2003). It could also be argued that one of the crucial issue facing 
contemporary social security systems is to realize both solidarity and 
subsidiarity. 
The concept of subsidiarity is still open to different interpretations. 
Especially the horizontal subsidiarity is a rather vague term. Sometimes it 
is seen as a complete opposition to the “state versus market” question: 
“The EU is the outcome of an alliance between the state and the market 
(implying an institutionalization of individualism), while horizontal 
subsidiarity implies a societal citizenship, completely different from the 
dyadic (State-Market) model (Active Citizenship 2003)”.  
In the above citation, horizontal subsidiarity has a strong 
normative meaning. Subsidiarity is indeed a normative concept. In this 
paper however, a more positive approach to the issues is attempted. 
Taking the vertical subsidiarity as an example, the main question here is 
therefore  not: “What should the relations between various levels of 
government and between the EU and member states be?” The article                         SUBSIDIARITY IN OLD-AGE SECURITY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION   7  
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tries to answer what the relations are like at present, how they can 
change, and what arguments exist for and against changes? 
  Taking into account that in old-age security horizontal subsidiarity 
seems to be both the traditional and indeed very modern fundamental 
question (without using the term explicitly), we will start with this issue. 
 
2. Horizontal subsidiarity in old-age security in the 
enlarged  EU 
2.1. Old-age security between person, society, market and state 
  In the following, the term “old-age security” is broadly understood 
as all regular sources of financing consumption in old age. There can be 
different “producers” of old-age security, including the individual, saving 
for his/her old age, a given community, organizing for example a support 
fund, market, for example insurance companies or banks, and state, 
organizing a social security system. In this sense, horizontal subsidiarity 
has always been present in old-age security, as it has always been 
delivered by these various “actors”. What has changed throughout the 
history of social security, is the relation of those various sources. It has 
remained one of the crucial issues in debates on pension reforms in the 
world and will be discussed further in this paper. Whatever the source 
and whatever the design, every pension system is a mechanism for 
organizing claims on future production (Barr 2002). 
  There are two quite separate questions to be answered in every 
old-age security system, both related to horizontal subsidiarity. The first, 
about scale, is how big should the obligatory system be, and how much 
should be left to voluntary provision by the person, to his/her own 
responsibility. The second, rather technical question, is about structure: 
who should deliver the obligatory pensions, should they be publicly or 
privately provided, financed on the pay-as-you go basis or be funded 
(Barrr 2001). Public-private mix mostly describes only the second issue. 
However, from the point of view of horizontal subsidiarity, the first 
question is equally important. Principle of horizontal subsidiarity suggests 
that the state should not violate freedom and replace responsibility of 
people for their old age, neither by delivering public pensions nor 
imposing obligation on people to participate in a private system. 
The traditional economic argument for state involvement in 
organizing pensions have been negative external effects of non-
insurance. People who choose not to insure for their old age will have to 
rely on others in financing their consumption in old age, thus imposing 
external costs on the rest of society. In this sense, an obligatory pension 8   MACIEJ ZUKOWSKI 
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system can be seen as a protection of society against shortsightedness or 
deliberate “free rider behaviour” of a minority. In fact, this is an 
argument for an obligatory system, not necessarily organized by the 
state. Secondly, it can be a justification only for a pension system which 
guarantees only a minimum protection.  
Economic arguments which traditionally have been raised in favour 
of state involvement in some other social areas, like health, not always 
concern pensions. The strong development of state role in pension 
systems can thus be more attributed to equity than to efficiency 
arguments (a classical presentation of efficiency and equity arguments 
for social policy – see Barr 1998). 
However, this statement underestimates the problems with 
information. They can be a justification of a larger state pension system 
and of an important role of the state in organizing and supervising private 
provision for old age. The welfare state in this sense not only fulfills its 
“Robin Hood” function, through poverty relief, redistribution of income 
and wealth, and the reduction of social exclusion. It also has the “piggy-
bank” function: ensuring mechanisms for insurance and for redistribution 
over the life cycle (Barr 2001). 
  The economic arguments for or against state involvement in 
social policy can indeed be seen as an excellent example of principle of 
subsidiarity, although the term is not used. Where the markets are 
efficient, state should not intervene for efficiency reasons, and the 
distributional objectives are generally best achieved through income 
transfers. However, where the assumptions of an efficient market 
allocation do not hold, state intervention is justified, both for reasons of 
efficiency and equity. (Barr 1998, 2002).  
What is the place of society in old-age security? Originally, family 
protected its members in old age. Today, such “informal systems of old-
age support” are the only source of protection in old age for many people 
in poor countries (World Bank 1994). However in developed countries 
family now plays a minor role in supporting financially its members in old 
age. 
In the history of social security, an important role has also been 
played by collective action of groups facing the same risks and organizing 
“self support” (e.g. friendly societies). Now, the role of such provision is 
relatively small. There is relatively little “society” in pensions, and the 
main role is played by dichotomy: state – market which is also typical for 
economics. Society has been largely absent from the discussion. If the 
horizontal subsiadirity is understood as implying a societal citizenship 
(see section 1.5), there is little horizontal subsidiarity in pensions at 
present. However, here the increasing role of market in delivering old-                        SUBSIDIARITY IN OLD-AGE SECURITY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION   9  
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age security is seen as an increasing role of horizontal subsidiarity in 
pensions.  
  Another aspect of horizontal subsidiarity is also self-government, 
typical for social insurance.  
 
2.2. The EU-15  
There is the well known diversity of structures and solutions in 
old-age security  systems in the EU-15 (MISSOC 2004, Council of the 
European Union 2003). This is also related to the vertical subsidiarity: the 
fact that social security systems, including their major branch: pension 
systems, are clearly in the competence of the member states (see section 
3.2). 
There is therefore no European Social Model if common solutions 
are understood under this term. However, EU countries have in common 
that it is the state which plays the major role as pension provider. In 
every country of EU-15 state pensions are the biggest item in the 
structure of their  multitier systems.  
  It is thus the structure, the market-state division that makes the 
difference between Europe and, for example, USA. The scale, i.e. total 
net social protection expenditure, covering both public and obligatory 
private expenditure, is of a similar level throughout the industrialized 
world (European Commission 2004, p. 53). Its share in the GDP is at the 
level of 24.5 % in the USA,  24.4 % in Denmark or 22.3 % in Italy.  
Of course, as there is no one European Social Model, the situation 
in various countries differs. As data from the first Joint Report on 
Pensions of 2003 demonstrate, for example in Austria only some 10 % of 
insured in social insurance have earned right to an occupational pension 
and only 2 % of current pensioners receive an occupational pension. On 
the other hand, in the Netherlands 91 % of all employees belong to a 
pension system of the second tier, and 83 % of pensioners households 
receive an additional pension (Council of the European Union 2003, pp. 
31-32).  
  The data show that in many European countries the scale of 
obligatory pension systems has become that large throughout the 
development of social security that it  has  replaced personal 
responsibility for old age. Both elements: large scale of obligatory 
systems and the state dominance, suggest that there is relatively little 
horizontal subsidiarity in old-age security in Europe. 
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2.3. The new member states 
As the focus of this paper are new member states of the enlarged 
EU, the presentation in this paragraph will be somewhat more 
comprehensive than it was the case with the relatively much better 
known situation in the EU-15. 
Pension systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
have a long tradition. The different legacies from the time before the 
Second World War as well as differences in circumstances under socialism 
have led to differentiation of pension systems in these countries (on the 
“socialist legacy” see Voirin 1994, Schmähl and Horstmann 2002). 
  The fundamental thing in common in those countries was however 
the fact that pension benefits were in principle provided entirely by the 
state. The market in pensions, as in other areas of social policy, was non-
existent.  
Using the 3 tiers model of describing the present old-age security 
systems, the 10 can be divided into two groups (table 2). Five new EU-
member states have introduced a structural pension reform:  a 
mandatory second tier of the pension system: Hungary (1998), Poland 
(1999), Latvia (2001), Estonia (2002) and Lithuania (2004). The 
remaining countries can be labeled “parametric cases”: Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
 
 
Table 2  Scale and structure (tiers) of old-age security  
in the 10 new EU member states in 2002 
 
Country  Contribution in  
obligatory system 
for employees: 
Type and rate (% 
of wages) 
Ceiling on 
obligatory 
contribution 
1
st Tier  
Social 
security 
2
nd Tier  3
rd Tier 
Cyprus Social  insurance 
contribution 
16.6%: 
Employees: 6.3%  
Employers: 6.3%  
Government: 4% 
Ceiling: 
about 1.8 
times average 
national wage  
and salary 
Earnings-
related 
Voluntary 
occupa-
tional 
pension 
schemes 
(public 
sector) 
Individual 
provision 
Czech 
Republic 
Global social 
insurance 
contribution 26%: 
No ceiling for 
employees; 
ceiling for self-
Earnings-
related with 
flat-rate 
Voluntary 
pension 
funds 
Individual 
provision                         SUBSIDIARITY IN OLD-AGE SECURITY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION   11 
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Employees: 6.5%  
Employers: 19.5%  
employed component 
Estonia  Social tax – part 
for pension 
insurance: 22%: 
Employees: 2% 
Employers: 20% 
No ceiling on 
social tax 
Flat rate 
plus 
earnings-
related 
Obligatory 
pension 
funds  
Individual 
provision 
Hungary Pension  insurance 
contribution 34% 
(both tiers): 
Employees:  
- First tier8 % (if 
only in 1
st) or 2% 
- Second tier: 6% 
Employers:  
Only first tier: 18% 
Ceiling on  
contribution 
from 
employees 
(both pillars):  
about 2.0 
times average 
national wage 
and salary. 
Employers: no 
ceiling 
Earnings-
related 
Obligatory 
pension 
funds 
Voluntary 
pension 
funds and 
other 
Latvia Global  social 
insurance contri-
bution: 35.09%: 
Employees: 9% 
(if in 2
nd tier: 2% 
channeled to it) 
Employers: 
26.09% 
Ceiling on 
global social 
insurance 
contribution: 
around 8-9 
times average 
national wage 
and salary 
NDC Obligatory 
pension 
funds 
Private 
pension 
funds and 
other  
Lithu-
ania 
Pension insurance 
contribution: 25%: 
Employees: 2.5% 
Employers: 22.5% 
No ceiling for 
employees; 
ceiling for self-
employed 
DB social 
insurance 
with a flat-
rate 
component 
Obligatory 
pension 
funds (to 
start 2004) 
Private 
pension 
funds and 
other  
Malta Social  insurance 
contribution 30%: 
Employees: 10% 
Employers: 10%  
State: 10% 
Ceiling:  
about 1.5 
times average 
national wage 
and salary 
Earnings-
related 
No Individual 
provision 
Poland  Old age insurance 
contribution (both 
tiers): 19.52%: 
Employees: 9.76%  
Employers: 9.76%  
Ceiling: 
2.5 times 
average 
national wage 
and salary 
NDC Obligatory 
pension 
funds  
Occupa-
tional  
pension 
program
mes or  
individual 12   MACIEJ ZUKOWSKI 
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provison 
Slovakia   Pension insurance 
contribution 28%: 
Employees: 6.4% 
Employers: 21.6% 
Ceiling: around 
2.5 times 
average 
national wage 
and salary 
Earnings-
related 
Voluntary 
supplement
-ary 
pension 
funds 
Individual 
provision 
Slovenia Pension  insurance 
contribution  
24.35%: 
Employees: 15.5% 
Employers: 8.85% 
No ceiling for 
employees; 
ceiling for self-
employed 
Earnings-
related 
Voluntary 
individual 
and  
collective   
pension 
schemes 
Individual 
provision 
DB: defined benefit 
NDC: notional defined contribution 
Source:    Author, based on GVG 2003a,b,c; MISSCEEC 2002; 
EUROSTAT 2003;  
partly own estimates. 
 
  As always in such comparisons, this is a simplification. For 
example, in Slovakia “earnings-relation” is extremely, but in Hungary 
only slightly  regressive.  
In both Mediterranean new EU member states old-age security is 
clearly dominated by the state. “The pension system in Cyprus is almost 
entirely public”. “There exists no second pillar pension system in Malta, 
by which workers would contribute towards a retirement fund. In the 
same manner, there exist no occupational pension schemes…” (GVG 
2003a). 
The majority of the 8 former socialist countries has changed the 
public-private mix in pensions dramatically. This has led to a conclusion 
that “we can observe more convergence between the transition 
economies than it is possible to identify among current EU member 
states” (Pellny and Horstmann 2003, p. 250). 
One of the explanation s  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m o r e  n e w  t h a n  o l d  
member states have introduced a radical (or “paradigmatic”: Holzmann 
et al., eds., 2003) pension reform can be the socialist legacy of the first. 
They “have undergone a profound ideological shift” (Holzmann, 
MacKellar, Rutkowski 2003, p.10). The partial privatization of the old-age 
security in some of the countries may be seen as one of the results of 
that shift. It is an attempt to accelerate the developments which in 
Western European countries took several decades: development of 
market (and funding) in pensions. The aim was also to increase savings                         SUBSIDIARITY IN OLD-AGE SECURITY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION   13 
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and growth, to catch up with the old EU (Holzmann, MacKellar, Rutkowski 
2003, p.10). 
There are again differences between the countries, concerning the 
depth, form and instruments of the reform. To understand the situation 
better, it seems useful to present country studies. One parametric case 
(Czech Republic) and one example of structural reforms (Poland) will be 
now presented. For the reasons of space, only some crucial elements will 
be demonstrated. The focus will also be on the public-private mix and the 
horizontal subsidiarity issue (on details see Schmähl and Horstmann 
2002; GVG 2003a,b,c,d; Schmähl 2003; Fultz 2003). 
 
The case of the Czech Republic 
There has been a series of important changes in old-age security 
in Czechoslovakia since 1989 and afterwards, after the separation of both 
parts in 2002, in the Czech Republic, without however breaking with the 
long-standing tradition of a social insurance system (see Potoucek 2001 
on general overview of developments in social security after 1989 and 
Tomes et al. 2003 on the developments in the pension system). 
The main changes between 1989 and 1992 included removing of 
inequalities in pension rules and starting regular indexation.  In 1993 
social insurance contributions were introduced. In 1994 new voluntary 
supplementary pension funds were introduced, one of the first in the 
region. Contributions of the insured were subsidized by the state. 44 
funds were created, their number was reduced to 11 by 2002. Over 2.5 
million people are now insured (50 per cent of the labour force). “By 
supplementing the mandatory pension system by a voluntary one the 
idea that people should take care of their future needs was successfully 
emphasized” (Tomes et al. 2003, p. 44).  
In 1995 a “parametric” pension reform was realized. It tied 
pensions to periods of insurance, increased retirement age, and 
introduced a new two-tier pension formula (flat rate plus earnings-
related). In 1999 a limited tax advantage to the supplementary pension 
funds was introduced. In 2001 some further changes into social insurance 
were introduced, aiming at encouraging later retirement. 
In the opinion of the prominent Czech expert, „the pension system 
is adequate with regard to income security in old age for the low-income 
groups, but not for the middle and upper income groups….The 
intergenerational distribution is on European average level but if 
sustainability of the system is to be maintained, it will grow out of any 
proportion” (Tomes et al. 2003, p. 37).  
The present old-age security system in the Czech Republic is thus 
clearly public and highly redistributive (a regressive pension formula, no 14   MACIEJ ZUKOWSKI 
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ceiling on contributions). There has been however also an important 
private element introduced, on a voluntary basis, subsidized by the state.    
The case of the Czech Republic clearly differs from the regional 
pattern of structural reforms with partial privatization (like in the 
neighbouring countries Poland and Hungary). However, as  the financial 
sustainability of the system has not been secured by the previous reforms 
and the deficit of the social insurance is growing, the discussion on the 
future direction of old-age security in the Czech Republic continues. The 
options include also introduction of obligatory pension funds (Laursen 
2000; Lasagabaster et al. 2002). 
 
The case of Poland 
As other countries of the region, Poland has a long-standing 
tradition of social insurance, influenced originally by German and Austrian 
patterns. The state old-age pension system inherited from socialist era in 
1989 was almost the only source of old-age security.  
In the first period after 1989 some parametric changes were 
introduced into the system, like new pension formula and indexing 
mechanism. Also, extensive earlier retirement possibilities were 
introduced which was intended to decrease pressure on labour market in 
the face of rapidly growing unemployment. Due to increase of pension 
level, incomes of retirees have been relatively protected in this difficult 
time, but financial situation of pension system deteriorated. 
After several unsuccessful attempts, in 1996-1998 a major 
pension reform concept under the title “Security through Diversity” was 
worked out (on details see Zukowski 2003). The reform aimed both at 
solving structural problems of pension system and was influenced by 
macroeconomic considerations. The new system, completely different 
from the old, started in 1999. People after 50 years of age at 1 January 
1999 stayed in the old system and all the pensions granted now and in 
next years will be based on previous rules. All the younger were covered 
by the new rules. However, those between 30 and 50 had one year to 
decide whether to join also the second pillar or to stay wholly in the new 
first one (in both cases the total contribution is the same). The youngest, 
under 30 in 1999, were fully covered by both pillars of the new system. 
The new system consists of two obligatory parts (“pillars”). The 
first one is an NDC system, based on Swedish or Latvian model. The 
second are privately managed fully funded competing pension funds, 
based on Latin American models. The reform thus means partial 
privatization of old-age security (an excellent analysis of pension 
privatization in the whole region and comparison to Latin America - Müller 
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This has been a clear shift from state to the market, a new public-
private mix has been introduced. Of course, the state has an important 
role to play in the second pillar even if it has left direct provision to the 
market companies. However, also the overall scale of the system has 
changed only slightly. Now, people earning more than 2.5 times national 
average do not have to pay contributions on income above the ceiling. 
Until the ceiling however the freedom of a person is reduced only to the 
choice of a pension fund. This should be considered when analyzing the 
Polish case as apparently moving clearly into the direction of subsidiarity. 
No elements of self governance have been introduced into the system 
either. 
Fundamental pension reform like in Poland, similar to those in 
some other CEECs raises interesting questions for the future of old-age 
security in Europe (see section 4). 
 
3. Vertical subsidiarity in old-age security in the 
enlarged  EU  
3.1. Old-age security on various levels of government  
  Old-age security is a broad concept. It may consist of many tiers 
(pillars) organized on various levels and with different scope, ranging 
from employees of one company until all citizens or residents of a 
country. Clearly, various elements can (and should) be organized locally. 
There is thus certainly a case for vertical subsidiarity in the old-age 
security within a state. A special issue are pension systems in a federal 
state. 
  As far as the main elements of old-age security systems is 
concerned, that is the general obligatory system, organized by the state, 
it seems to be a clear case for a national (federal) system. Theory of 
fiscal federalism seems to support such conclusion (an excellent essay on 
fiscal federalism: Oates 1999). Such a system can make use of 
economies of scale, of spreading risks on a larger scale. It has also one 
crucial advantage: it does not hinder mobility of people – an argument 
raised now even on a higher level – for a supranational system (see 
section 4.3). 
 
3.2. The competences so far: central governments of member 
states plus coordination 
Two issues should be raised when considering vertical subsidiarity 
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responsibilities in that area within member states. The second is about 
the relations of competences between member states and EU. 
In the EU-15 central governments have clearly the main 
competence in old- age security, especially in its main element: social 
security. Old-age security is probably one of the most centralized social 
systems. However, especially in federal states, certain division of powers 
between federal and regional governments does exist. An example may 
be administration of pension insurance in Germany. Decentralization of 
old-age pensions in federal states is subject of a separate presentation at 
this conference.  
As far as the second issue of vertical subsidiarity is concerned, 
social security in general, and old-age security in particular, belong to the 
areas, where policy decisions are taken at the national, and only some at 
EU level (a recent survey on the whole issue of relationship between the 
member states and the EU: Dashwood 2004). Old-age security is a 
competence of the EU member states. In a survey on relations between 
EU and member states in various areas, Longo (2003) locates “social 
welfare”, together for example with health, among those areas where 
only some political decisions are taken at EU level. 
The main competence of the EU in the area of social security, 
including old- age security, is the “classical” coordination of social 
security system. This competence is following directly from the original 
competence in free movement of persons. The system of coordination 
may be seen as an excellent example of (vertical) subsidiarity: every 
member state is responsible for its own social security system, and the 
EU only solves problems which go beyond the borders of the member 
states and can more effectively be solved at the Union’s level. 
This is a well known picture of division of powers in social security. 
However, it may be somewhat different if we understand old-age security 
broader, and not only as obligatory public social security systems, as is 
often the case in the EU. In areas important for functioning of private and 
funded pension systems, competences of the EU are stronger than in 
social security. “Competition” has been classified as an area in which 
decisions are taken at both national and EU level, and “capital flows” as 
such in which mostly policy decisions are taken at EU level (Longo 2003). 
As long as old-age security remains publicly organized and with 
little elements of markets, it will stay in the competence of the members 
s t a t e s .  H o w e v e r ,  b o t h  i n t e r n a l  p r o b l e m s  o f  s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  o f  p e n s i o n  
systems as well as external influences under globalization can rather lead 
to increasing role of market and competition in that sphere, and as a 
consequence, to increasing role of the EU (see section 4.3).  
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3.3. The enlarged EU  
  Old-age security systems are centralized in new member states. 
This can be explained by history of half century of highly centralized 
political systems, by the fact that no single new EU member is a federal 
state and also by the fact that most of the “new” are small countries (half 
of the “new”: Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia and Latvia have population 
below 2.5 million). But also in the largest country Poland with population 
38.6 million the whole old-age security is highly centralized, in the 
competence of national government.  
  Positions of the new member states on division of powers in the 
EU are as different as they are in the “old” EU. “The positions taken by 
representatives of governments and national parliaments at the European 
Convention show that divergences in the EU integration process do not 
occur between new and older member states (or between “new and old 
Europe” representation), but following sovereign interests of each 
particular country” (Franck and Pyszna-Nigge 2003, p. 4). 
  The new member states are similar to the old under many 
respects, but on a quite different level of income and welfare. This may 
lead to higher migration and as a result to an increase of problems with 
realization of free movement in the era of globalization. In this way 
Enlargement may facilitate change in competences concerning pensions 
in the EU, as may also accession of countries with new, market-oriented 
old-age security systems, where competences of the EU are stronger. 
 
4. The future of subsidiarity in old-age security in the 
enlarged EU 
4.1. Changes in scale and structure? 
  Interestingly, much more often the structure of old-age security is 
discussed than its scale. However, taking horizontal subsidiarity as 
starting point, the scale is exactly the main issue, i.e. how large the 
obligatory system (imposed by the state) should be, whether publicly or 
privately provided and how much can be left to the individual. Old-age 
security could rely more on responsibility of individuals and on societal 
action. New EU member states are not necessarily good examples as far 
as the scale of obligatory systems is concerned. In order to accelerate 
development of market and funding in pensions and reach all the 
expected objectives they opted for obligatory funded systems which did 
not change the scale of old-age security. 
  They may be however a good example of a new structure of old-
age security, based on a new public-private mix. Seen sometimes as a 18   MACIEJ ZUKOWSKI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  55/2005 
danger to European Social  Model (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003) they may 
also be seen as a chance to facilitate expected reform (Holzmann et al. 
2003). New conditions (demography, labour market, society, mobility, 
globalization) require new solutions in pension design (Augustinovics 
2002). Both NDC, introduced in some of the countries both in the old and 
the new EU and the obligatory pension funds, mainly a CEEC’s solution, 
may be examples of good practice for others, as a good answer to new 
conditions and challenges (Holzmann 2004). These are however not the 
only options, as given objectives in a pension system may be reached by 
variety of solutions (Barr 2002), also by a package of carefully designed  
changes (European Commission 2004) which are labeled  as “parametric” 
mainly by proponents of radical reforms. 
  
4.2. OMC and subsidiarity  
A reference to the principle of subsidiarity is appearing in every 
document on open method of coordination, including OMC in pensions.  
This issue will only be mentioned very briefly here as this is a separate 
topic at the conference. 
OMC seems to be a reasonable way both to achieve progress in an 
area which lies in competences of member states and fully respect these 
competences. The High Level Group states that the OMC takes an 
intermediate position in the whole range of available methods, from a 
mere inter-governmental cooperation to harmonization. “The strength of 
the open method of co-ordination is based on the fact that it encourages 
co-operation at European level to bring about structural reform in policy 
areas for  which Member States remain entirely responsible” (European 
Commission 2004, p.72). 
Accession of 10 new member states will make the whole process 
even more complicated and may in this way rather further strengthen the 
subsidiarity in old-age security. Such position is supported by the rather 
sceptical assessment of OMC by proponents of a more radical 
(“paradigmatic”) change. For them, OMC is insufficient because it is 
thought to be very slow, unlikely to lead to a comprehensive reform, but 
rather to parametric reforms, and “the method will not create a vision for 
a pan-European reform” (Holzmann, MacKellar, Rutkowski 2003, p.12). 
 
4.3. Europeanizing old-age security? 
What is the future of vertical subsidiarity in old-age security in the 
EU after Enlargement? If diversity has been a crucial obstacle to 
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now,  when the differences have grown further, both as far as the welfare 
level as well as institutional structure are concerned (see section 2.2),  a 
harmonization seems even less likely. But would it be desirable?  
  Feldstein (2001) has argued that the governments of the EU 
member states face a double problem in dealing with the future of the 
social security pension systems. Like in many other countries around the 
world, they must deal with the rising cost of pensions due, especially, to 
the aging of the population. But an extra problem also exists in the EU: 
pension systems should not be an obstacle for labour mobility. Feldsteins 
develops a solution to this double problem: an NDC system plus an 
“investment-based system of individual accounts”. 
Holzmann (2004) uses similar arguments to Feldstein, but on a 
broader basis of demographic, social and economic changes. He is in 
favour of working towards a Pan-European pension structure which could 
both help to solve internal problems of pension systems as well as create 
less problems for mobility between countries with different structures of 
old-age security systems. This suggested structure is a “multi-pillar 
system, with a non-financial (or notional) defined contribution (NDC) 
system at its core, and coordinated supplementary funded pensions and 
social pensions at its wings”. The author points to the fact that some of 
the new EU member states already have such a desired structure of the 
old-age security. But: does it really call for a bigger role of EU  (thus an 
issue of vertical subsidiarity) or rather for a more similar structure, 
including more market and thus an issue of horizontal subsidiarity? 
Holzmann finds an approach initiated and led by EU Commission not 
likely and suggests instead a cross-country led government approach.  
However, even if changes increasing the role of funded, private 
systems in the EU come “from below”, that is from the member states 
more than “from above”: the Union level, they may eventually lead to 
more Europeanizing of this field through the economic competences of 
the Union (see section 3.2).  The accession to the Union of countries 
where the processes of moving old-age security systems in the directions 
“market” and “competition” have been partly even more developed may 
accelerate the process.   
 
Conclusions 
Questions like “How much responsibility should a person have for 
own old age?”, “How much market, why and how much state should be in 
old-age security?”,  “What are (should be) the relations between society, 
market and (different levels of) state in old-age security?” have always 
been crucial in analysis of this field. These are issues of subsidiarity in 20   MACIEJ ZUKOWSKI 
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old-age security, although they have been extremely rarely discussed 
under this label. The first conclusion is thus that subsidiarity seems to 
offer an attractive approach to deal with old-age security. 
However not much discussed either, the EU Enlargement 2004 
may have an influence on both horizontal and vertical subsidiarity in old-
age security systems in the EU.  
As far as horizontal subsidiarity is concerned, some of the new 
member states have brought into EU a different structure of their 
obligatory systems,  partly more market in delivering pensions, although 
not necessarily more personal responsibility for old age.   
On the vertical subsidiarity, diversity and migration, to increase 
due to Enlargement, may strengthen the case for more Europeanizing of 
that field, but on the other hand make it even more difficult. However, 
modernization in the sense of moving old-age security in the direction of 
market and competition may increase the competences of the EU in old-
age security.  
The Enlargement may thus influence both modernization and 
Europeanizing of old-age security in the European Union. 
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